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Analyzing carefully an experimentally feasible non-entangled single qubit quantum secret sharing
protocol and its modified version [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 230505 (2005); ibid. 98, 028902 (2007)],
it is found that both versions are insecure against coherent attacks though the original idea is
so remarkable. To overcome this fatal flaw, here we propose a protocol with a distinct security
checking strategy, which still involves single qubit operations only, making it possible to achieve
better security of quantum secret sharing with current technology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Alice has some secret data, e.g., the pass-
word for a locker or the access code for a computer pro-
gram. She wants her employees to share the data so
that it can be regained if and only if all employees col-
laborate, while any subset of the employees cannot do
so successfully. This is a typical secret sharing prob-
lem. Secret sharing is also an element for building up
many other complicated cryptographic protocols. With
the fascinating development of quantum cryptography,
using quantum methods to achieve secure secret sharing
has caught great interests both theoretically and exper-
imentally [1–6]. However, most of the quantum secret
sharing (QSS) protocols have to rely on entangled quan-
tum states. So far, the preparation of entangled states
has still been quite inconvenient in practice, and it has
been even harder to store them for more than a brief time,
especially when different parts of the entangled states are
shared and kept separated by different participants. For
this reason, even though some of these protocols can be
demonstrated in laboratory, they are likely still far from
practical applications.
Recently, a novel QSS protocol was proposed and ex-
perimentally demonstrated by Schmid et al. [7], which
involves non-entangled single qubits only. Thus the pro-
tocol is very promising in practice. However, a subtle
security loophole was found later [8]. A modification on
the original protocol was then proposed by Schmid et
al. [9]. But here it will be shown that the modified one
is even less secure than the original one. Most impor-
tant, we propose a novel protocol with a distinct security
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checking strategy. It closes the existing security loopholes
successfully, while the great feasibility of the original pro-
tocol is still maintained. Therefore, the present protocol
is of significance both theoretically and practically.
In the next section, we will briefly describe the origi-
nal protocol proposed in Ref. [7] and the corresponding
cheating strategy proposed in Ref. [8]. In Sec. 3, the
modified protocol proposed in Ref. [9] will be outlined,
and our cheating strategy to this version will be proposed.
Then we will give a simple solution to these two cheating
strategies, and pinpointing out the remaining loopholes
in Sec. 4. Our novel protocol will be proposed in Sec. 5,
and the security analysis will be elaborated in Sec. 6.
II. THE ORIGINAL PROTOCOL AND THE
CORRESPONDING CHEATING STRATEGY
First, we would like to note that the QSS protocols
involved in this paper all concentrate on the sharing of
a single classical bit. But in fact, such protocols can be
used for sharing any kind of information. For example, if
Alice wants the other participants to share a classical m-
bit string, they can simply run the protocol m times. Or
if they want to share a quantum state, Alice can prepare
a quantum system in this state, then applies on it an uni-
tary transformation Ux ∈ {U1, U2, ..., Um}, and gives the
quantum system to any one of the participants. Mean-
while, she shares the classical data x among all other
participants with the protocol. Then the secret quan-
tum state can be recovered when all other participants
collaborate, while any subset of the participants cannot
know which unitary transformation is Ux, so they can-
not unlock the secret even if they own the corresponding
quantum system.
Now let us recall briefly the original QSS protocol pro-
posed by Schmid et al. [7]. The goal of the proposal
2is that: after each of N participants inputs the secret
data, any N − 1 participants should be able to infer the
secret input of the remaining participant if and only if
they collaborate. That is, the protocol has the flexibility
that any one of the participants can be regarded as Al-
ice, while the other N − 1 participants can be regarded
as the employees who share the secret data of Alice. Let
|0〉 and |1〉 denote the two orthonormal states of a qubit.
Define |±x〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)√2 and |±y〉 = (|0〉 ± i |1〉)/√2.
The original protocol is actually stated as follows.
(1) The first participant R1 prepares a single qubit in
the state |+x〉.
(2) The qubit is passed through the N participants se-
quently. Each participant Rj ( j = 1, ..., N) chooses the
secret data ϕj ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} (RN can simply choose
between 0 and pi/2), and acts on the qubit with the uni-
tary phase operator
Uˆj(ϕj) =
{ |0〉 → |0〉
|1〉 → eiϕj |1〉 . (1)
(3) The last participant RN measures the qubit in the
basis |±x〉. This completes one run of the qubit commu-
nication.
(4) Each participant divides his action for every run
into two classes: a class X corresponding to ϕj ∈ {0, pi}
and a class Y corresponding to ϕj ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}. They
broadcast the class of their action for each run in random
order, but keep the particular value of ϕj secret.
(5) With the announced classification, they determine
which runs are valid runs that satisfy the condition∣∣∣cos(∑Nj ϕj)
∣∣∣ = 1 and lead to a deterministic measure-
ment result of RN .
(6) The security check: the participants choose a sub-
set of valid runs, and announced the value of ϕj of each
participant in random order. They make comparison be-
tween these values and the measurement result in step (3)
to detect cheating.
(7) The task of secret sharing is achieved with the re-
maining valid runs. When any subset of N − 1 partic-
ipants wants to infer the choice of ϕR of the remaining
participant, they reveal among themselves their values of
ϕj. In the case in which this subset contains the last par-
ticipant, he reveals the measurement result in step (3).
In this protocol, a secret classical bit being shared can
be encoded with the secret input ϕj of each participant
(j = 1, ..., N − 1). For example, ϕj = 0 and ϕj = pi/2
can represent the bit 0, while ϕj = pi and ϕj = 3pi/2 can
represent the bit 1. The secret of the last participant RN
is his measurement result in step (3).
A significant merit of this protocol lies in that only the
local manipulation of phases on a communicated single
qubit is needed, and thus it is very feasible for practical
realization. Unfortunately, although the protocol can in-
deed accomplish the task that any N−1 participants are
able to infer the choice of ϕR of the remaining participant
if they collaborate, it was shown in Ref. [8] that a subset
of less than N − 1 participants may also reach this goal
in certain cases, namely, the protocol does not reach the
security it was supposed to have. The cheating strategy
in Ref. [8] is outlined below.
Cheating strategy A:
Suppose that the kth participant Rk ( k ∈ {2, ..., N −
1}) is cheating. After he receives the qubit χk−1 from
Rk−1 in step (2), he does not apply the operator Uˆk(ϕk)
on it to obtain χk and pass it to Rk+1. Instead, he keeps
the qubit unmeasured. He also prepares an EPR pair
|ψφ〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, and sends φ to Rk+1 as χk
while keeping ψ to himself. In step (4) when he broad-
casts the class of his action, there can be two cases:
(i) Some Rj ( j < k) has not broadcast the class of
his action yet. Then Rk will take no advantage from the
cheating. But he will not be caught either, because he can
infer the class of the action corresponding to ϕk to an-
nounce by performing a collective measurement on χk−1
and ψ in the basis {(|00〉± |11〉)/√2, (|01〉± i |10〉)/√2}.
This will make φ collapse to Uˆ(ϕk) |χk−1〉, where the
value of ϕk belongs to the class X (or Y ) action if
his measurement result is (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 (or (|01〉 ±
i |10〉)/√2). He can further infer the exact value of ϕk
to announce in the security check in step (6). This is
because all participants have announced their classes of
actions before the check, thus he can count the number of
the class Y action among Rj ( j < k). If the number is
even (or odd), he knows that the state of χk−1 was |±x〉
(or |±y〉) before he measured it. Then he can calculate
ϕk by his above result of the collective measurement on
χk−1 and ψ.
(ii) All Rj ( j < k) have broadcast the classes of their
actions. Then Rk knows Ek−1 ≡
∣∣∣cos(∑k−1j ϕj)
∣∣∣. By
measuring χk−1 in the basis {(|0〉± i1−Ek−1 |1〉)/
√
2}, he
will know the state of χk−1. He also measures ψ in the
basis {|±x〉} or {|±y〉} to collapse φ into either |±x〉 or
|∓y〉, and compares the result of φ with |χk−1〉 to infer
ϕk to broadcast. Again, his cheating will not be detected.
But in this case he knows the exact state of χk−1 and χk.
Then a subset of less than N − 1 participants with Rk
included will be able to infer the choice of ϕR of another
participant.
III. THE MODIFIED PROTOCOL AND THE
CORRESPONDING CHEATING STRATEGY
Responding to Cheating strategy A, Schmid et al. pro-
posed a modified protocol [9], where they attempt to en-
sure that the second case never occurs and thus would
make the cheating futile.
Modified protocol 1:
All steps are the same as those of the original protocol,
except that in step (4), the participants always announce
the classification in the order RN → RN−1 → ...→ R1.
This modified protocol indeed evades the second case
of the cheating strategy, however, it is still insecure with
even poor security, as shown below.
3Cheating strategy B:
Similar to cheating strategy A, after the dishonest Rk
( k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}) receives the qubit χk−1 from Rk−1,
he prepares an EPR pair |ψφ〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, and
sends the second qubit φ to Rk+1 as χk while keeping
ψ to himself. But the difference is that he needs not to
keep χk−1 unmeasured in this strategy. Instead, he can
measures it immediately in either one of the basis |±x〉
or |±y〉 at his will.
In step (4) when Rk broadcasts the class of his action,
all Rj ( j > k) have broadcast the classes of their ac-
tions since it was thus suggested in modified protocol 1.
Rk counts the number of the class Y action among Rj
( j > k). If the number is even (or odd), he measures
the qubit ψ in the basis |±x〉 (or |±y〉). Thus he can
infer the state of φ (i.e., χk) from the entangled form
of |ψφ〉. By comparing the state with the result in his
previous measurement on χk−1, he can always infer ϕk
and finish the rest of the protocol successfully, just as if
he had applied the operator Uˆk(ϕk) on χk−1 and passed
it to Rk+1 without cheating. But unlike the honest pro-
tocol, in this case he always knows the exact states of
χk−1 and χk for any valid run. Therefore among the
first k participants (i.e., all Rj with j ≤ k), any subset
of N ′ = k−1 participants with Rk included can infer the
choice of ϕR of the remaining participant. Also, among
the last N − k + 1 participants (i.e., all Rj with j ≥ k),
any subset of N ′ = N − k participants with Rk included
can infer the choice of ϕR of the remaining participant.
Especially, if the participant R2 (RN−1) cheats with this
strategy, he alone can always know the choice of ϕ1 (ϕN )
of the first (last) participant.
This strategy cannot be detected as shown below. Con-
sider the case where the number of the class Y action
among Rj (j > k) is even. According to the strategy, Rk
measures the qubit ψ in the basis |±x〉. If he has mea-
sured the qubit χk−1 in the basis |±x〉 too, he announces
that he has applied a class X action. Then there can be
two cases. (i) |±x〉 is the wrong basis for measuring χk−1.
It means that the number of the class Y action among
the partners Rj (j < k) is odd. Thus the total number of
the class Y action among all partners Rj (j ∈ {1, ..., N})
will be odd, i.e., cos(
∑N
j ϕj) = 0 so that the correspond-
ing run will not be recognized as a valid run in step (5)
of the protocol. That is, even if Rk has not cheated, the
run will not lead to a deterministic measurement result
of RN . Therefore such a run cannot reveal Rk’s cheat-
ing. (ii) |±x〉 is the correct basis for measuring χk−1,
i.e., the number of the class Y action among the part-
ners Rj (j < k) is even. The corresponding run is then a
valid run that may be chosen for the security check. But
since the measurement results of Rk on both χk−1 and φ
(i.e., χk) are both correct, the value of ϕk he inferred can
surely pass any check successfully. On the other hand, if
Rk has measured χk−1 in |±y〉, he announces that he has
applied a class Y action. Then if |±y〉 is the wrong basis
for measuring χk−1, the run will not be a valid one either.
Or if |±y〉 is the correct basis, Rk’s measurement results
and inferred value are all correct. In either case, Rk’s
cheating can also escape from being detected. Similar
results can also be found in the case where the number
of the class Y action among Rj (j > k) is odd.
Therefore, the modified protocol 1 is not secure either.
Moreover, unlike the case of the original protocol, where
the cheating strategy A can only gain information on
the secret data in certain cases, the cheating strategy B
can always be successful for the modified one. In addi-
tion, the cheating strategy B is more feasible to be im-
plemented, because no collective measurements on χk−1
and ψ are required, while they are needed in the cheat-
ing strategy A. The cheater here even needs not to store
the qubit χk−1 for a long period of time. Consequently,
the modified protocol 1 proposed in Ref. [9] is even less
secure than the original one.
IV. A SIMPLE SOLUTION AND REMAINING
LOOPHOLES
If we want to defeat only the above cheating strategies
alone, we would have the following simple solution.
Modified protocol 2:
All steps are the same as those of the original protocol,
except that in step (4), the order in which the participants
announce the classification can be arbitrary, as long as
R1 and RN are always the last two to announce.
With this modification, when Rk (k ∈ {2, ..., N − 2})
is to broadcast the class of his action in step (4), the
cases where either all Rj (j > k) or all Rj (j < k) have
broadcast the classes of their actions will never occur.
Thus the protocol is made secure against the above two
cheating strategies.
Unfortunately, there are still some serious drawbacks
in this one. First, it cannot stand the multi-cheater at-
tack. Suppose that there are two cheaters, Rk (k ∈
{2, ..., N − 2}) and R1, and they exchange information
secretly. Then Rk can still cheat with the strategy A
in the case where the participant Rj (2 ≤ j < k) have
broadcast the classes of their actions before Rk does, be-
cause R1 can tell Rk his choice beforehand. For the same
reason, when Rk and RN are cheaters, the cheating strat-
egy B still works in the case where Rj (k < j ≤ N − 1)
have broadcast the classes of their actions before Rk does.
Similarly, even if we put further restrictions on the order
of the broadcast of the classes of actions (e.g., by fixing
the order as RN/2 → RN/2+1 → RN/2−1 → RN/2+2 →
... → R1 → RN when N is even), it is still possible to
cheat if more participants are dishonest. Second, none of
the above three versions is able to locate the cheater(s).
Even if the participants find disagreed announcement in
the security check, what they know is merely the exis-
tence of cheater(s), but they never know exactly who is
(are) cheating. Because of this, a dishonest participant
surely inclines to cheat as he is benefitted from a success-
ful cheating while has no risk to be caught, even if the
cheating fails.
4V. OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL
To close these security loopholes completely, below we
present a protocol with a distinct security checking strat-
egy.
Our improved protocol:
(I) The N participants agree on the number n of the
total runs of the qubit communication, a weight w (w >
0.75n is recommended), and a binary linear (n, l, d)-
code C [10], where the minimal distance d between every
pair of codewords satisfies n − w2/n − l/4 − lw/(2n) +
3lw2/(4n2) < d < 2(n − w) [11]. Each participant Rj
( j = 2, ..., N − 1) chooses secretly an n-bit codeword
cj = (cj1cj2...cjn) from C whose weight (the number of
1 in cj) is w.
(II) For i = 1 to n:
(II-1) R1 prepares a single qubit in the state
|+x〉.
(II-2) The qubit is passed through the N partici-
pants sequently. Each participant Rj ( j = 1, ..., N) ap-
plies an action on the qubit. For Rj ( j = 2, ..., N − 1),
the action is chosen according to the ith bit of the code-
word cj. If cji = 0, Rj applies a class X or Y action;
else if cji = 1, Rj applies a class Z action. R1 and RN
apply the class X or Y action only. The class Z action
means that Rj chooses the secret data ϕj1 ∈ {0, pi/2} and
acts on the qubit with Uˆj(ϕj1), then measures the qubit
in the basis |±x〉. He then chooses another secret data
ϕj2 ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} and acts on the measured qubit
with Uˆj(ϕj2), and sends the qubit to the next participant.
(II-3) RN measures the qubit in the basis |±x〉.
(III) For i = 1 to n, each Rj ( j = 2, ..., N − 1) an-
nounces the bit cji in random order. Thus at the end of
this stage, all codewords cj ( j = 2, ..., N−1) are publicly
aunnounced.
(IV) Security check 1: the participants check whether
each cj ( j = 2, ..., N − 1) is a codeword from C with the
weight w.
(V) For i = 1 to n, the participants who announced
cji = 0 broadcast the classes of their actions in random
order.
(VI) The participants determine which runs are valid
runs, i.e., the runs which contain no class Z action and
satisfy
∣∣∣cos(∑Nj ϕj)
∣∣∣ = 1.
(VII) Security check 2: the participants choose a subset
of valid runs and all the runs containing the class Z ac-
tion. For each valid run, each participant announces his
choice of ϕj in random order. They compare these values
with the measurement result in step (II-3) to detect cheat-
ing. For each run containing the class Z action, the par-
ticipants who applied the class X or Y action (except R1
and RN ) announce their choices of ϕj in random order.
Then R1, RN and these who applied the class Z action
announce (in any order) all their choices of ϕj1 (includ-
ing ϕN ) and the results of the measurement first, and
then all ϕj2 (including ϕ1), and check whether they are
in agreement with the announcements of the other par-
ticipants. That is, they use the measurement result and
the value of ϕj2 announced by a participant who applied
the class Z action and the values of ϕj announced by
these who applied the class X or Y action to infer what
measurement result should be found by the next partici-
pant who applied the class Z action, and check whether
this participant indeed found this result.
(VIII) When no disagreement is found, the task of se-
cret sharing is thus achieved with any of the remaining
valid runs. When any subset of N − 1 participants want
to infer the choice of ϕR of the remaining participant,
they reveal among themselves their values of ϕj and the
measurement result in step (II-3) if the last participant
is included in this subset.
VI. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
Obviously this protocol can accomplish the task that
any subset of N − 1 participants can infer the choice of
ϕR of the remaining participant if they collaborate. Also,
it will be proven here that the protocol can meet the re-
quirement that any subset of less than N−1 participants
cannot infer the choice of ϕR of a honest participant with
the above cheating strategies. The main reason is that
the introduction of the class Z action provides a physical
approach for honest participants to check the communi-
cation channel between them, so that limits are put to
the cheaters’ freedom on applying the cheating action.
Meanwhile, the codeword method adopted in the pro-
tocol can further give rigorous mathematical guarantee
that the remaining freedom of the cheater will result in
zero knowledge of the secret data.
Now we elaborate the proof in detail. Let us con-
sider the most severe case where N − 2 participants are
cheaters. Let Ra and Rb (a < b) denote the rest two hon-
est participants. Consider first the case where Ra and Rb
are neighbors in the qubit transmission, i.e., b = a + 1.
Obviously the other N − 2 cheaters can infer the value
of cos(ϕa + ϕb) only. But if they want to know each
secret data ϕa or ϕb alone, they must perform a man-
in-the-middle eavesdropping attack between Ra and Rb.
However, when the number n of the total runs of qubit
communication is sufficiently large, there will be plenty
of runs in which both Ra and Rb applied the class Z ac-
tion, and the bases in which Ra sending the qubit and Rb
measuring the qubit are exactly the same. When there is
no eavesdropper presented, the announcement of Ra and
Rb in security check 2 will match with each other. Else
if there is an eavesdropper between them who intercepts
and measures the qubit sent by Ra, and then resends it
to Rb, mismatched announcement will occur with a non-
vanishing probability in each of these runs. Then the
probability for the eavesdropper to escape the detection
will drop exponentially to zero as n increases. Therefore,
to infer any one of ϕa or ϕb, the N −2 cheaters still need
to collaborate with either Rb or Ra, i.e., the collaboration
of N − 1 participants is needed so the protocol is secure.
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are separated. Since the goal of the cheaters is to learn
the state of the qubit sent by Ra (or received by Rb) so
that ϕa (or ϕb) can be inferred, at least one cheater Rk
(a < k < b) between Ra and Rb must replace the honest
action with a cheating one (otherwise the participants are
acting honestly and there is no cheating at all). No mat-
ter what strategy the cheaters may use, it seems that
this cheating action should have the following general
features. To learn the state of the qubit sent by Ra, Rk
must stop the qubit instead of passing it to the next par-
ticipant, so that he can perform appropriate operations
later; and to continue with the protocol, Rk must pre-
pare and send the next participant another qubit, which
may entangled with other qubits or systems owned by
himself or other cheaters. The above cheating strategies
A and B are both such examples. Meanwhile, to pass
security checks, the cheating action must be able to be
announced as a classX , Y or Z action when needed. But
this cannot always be done, as proven by the following
four steps.
(a) To cheat successfully, the cheater Rk should be able
to announce the cheating action as a class X or Y ac-
tion. An honest classX or Y action cannot be announced
as a class Z action, because the participant cannot an-
nounce the result of the measurement on the qubit he
received correctly since he did not keep it. Therefore,
although a cheating action can always be announced as a
class Z action, if it cannot be announced as a class X or
Y action, Rk must apply the honest class X or Y action
for exactly n−w runs to pass security check 1. Then for
any valid run, the action of Rk is honest, cheating being
impossible.
(b) Rk cannot announce the cheating action as a class
X or Y action in a run where both Ra and Rb applied the
class Z action, or he will be detected in security check 2
with a non-trivial probability. To announce the cheating
action as a class X or Y action correctly, Rk needs to
know ϕk exactly. The value of ϕk will be affected by the
choice of ϕj of any single participant Rj (j 6= k). Thus
it can be determined only when Rk knows the classes of
actions of all Rj (a ≤ j < k) or all Rj (k < j ≤ b).
Therefore strategies A and B seem to be the only two
cheating strategies for Rk to infer ϕk. But if both Ra
and Rb applied the class Z action, they never need to
announce their choice before Rk announces ϕk in security
check 2. Thus Rk will not have enough information to
calculate the correct value of ϕk, so he has to announce
it by guess and stands a non-trivial probability to be
detected.
(c) The number of runs in which Rk can announce the
cheating action as a class X or Y action without being
detected is not sufficient for Rk to pass security check 1.
From point (b), it is seen that Rk can safely announce
the cheating action as any of the class X , Y or Z action
freely only in the runs where he is sure that either Ra or
Rb applied a class X or Y action. Now let us evaluate
the number of these runs.
In a (n, l, d)-code C, the number of possible codewords
having the weight w grows when n increases while l/n
and w/n are fixed and d < 2(n − w). Therefore when
only a few bits of the codeword used by Ra or Rb are
disclosed, Rk cannot know the rest of the codeword with
certainty. Suppose that Rk can identify the codeword
used by Ra or Rb only after l
′ bits are revealed. Then
in each of the first l′ runs, Rk cannot know the choices
of cji of Ra and Rb before they announce. Since in step
(III) cji is announced in a random order, there are three
possibilities: both Ra and Rb announced before Rk does;
one and only one of Ra and Rb announced before Rk
does; none of Ra and Rb announced before Rk does. In
the case where the cheater can get the most benefit, the
probabilities for these cases to occur are 1/4, 1/2, and
1/4, respectively (a rigorous calculation on these prob-
abilities is provided in the appendix). In the first two
cases Rk can be sure of the class of action of Ra and/or
Rb. Since each participant should apply the class Z ac-
tion w times, the probability for cai = 0 (or cbi = 0) is
1− w/n. Therefore, the probability for such a run to be
the one in which Rk can announce the cheating action as
a class X or Y action is
p1 = (1− w2/n2)/4 + (1 − w/n)/2. (2)
In each of the last n−l′ runs, suppose that the choice of
cji (i ∈ {l′ + 1, .., n}) of each participant can be inferred
by the others from the announced cji (i ∈ {1, .., l′}) of
the first l′ runs. Thus Rk knows the choice of action of
Ra and Rb before they announce. The probability for
such a run to be the one in which Rk can announce the
cheating action as a class X or Y action is then
p2 = 1− w2/n2. (3)
Totally, even if Rk applies the cheating action in all
the n runs, the maximum number of runs in which he can
announce the cheating action as a class X or Y action is
n′ = l′p1 + (n− l′)p2
= n− w2/n− l′/4− l′w/(2n) + 3l′w2/(4n2). (4)
Therefore, after Rk finishes applying all the actions
(either honest or cheating ones) on the n qubits in step
(II), the major part of the n-bit string ck which he can an-
nounce in step (III) is already determined. Only n′ bits at
the most can be altered between 0 and 1 by Rk according
to the announcement of Ra and Rb, while the other bits
have to be announced honestly or announced as 1. In gen-
eral, a codeword of a binary linear (n, l, d)-code C can be
identified if l or n−d bits are revealed, and l ≤ n−d holds
for any non-trivial binary linear code [11]. Therefore we
can take l′ = l in Eq. (4). Since it is suggested in the pro-
tocol to choose d > n−w2/n−l/4−lw/(2n)+3lw2/(4n2),
we have d > n′. Note that the distance between any code-
words of code C is not less than d, altering less than d
bits of a codeword will not result in another codeword.
Therefore, among all the possible strings which can be
6obtained by altering no more than n′ bits of ck, only
those less than 1/
(
n− n′/2
n′/2
)
portion are valid code-
words from C. Note that, which string is the one that
can finally be announced by Rk is determined by the po-
sition of the runs in which Ra or Rb announced either
cai = 0 or cbi = 0 before Rk announces cki. Due to the
random order of the announcement, Rk will generally not
be so lucky that the final string which he can announce
happens to be a valid codeword while has also the weight
w exactly, except with a probability which can be made
arbitrarily small by increasing n. Thus Rk cannot pass
security check 1 by altering n′ bits of ck.
(d) Seen from the above points, the probability for Rk
to cheat successfully is arbitrarily small as n increases.
Point (c) ensures that Rk is unable to cheat successfully
by altering his announcement on the choice of action only
in the runs in which Ra or Rb announced either cai =
0 or cbi = 0 before Rk announces cki. On the other
hand, a dishonest Rk may take the risk to announce the
cheating action as a class X or Y action in the runs
where both Ra and Rb applied the class Z action, so
that the announced string ck can be a valid codeword
with the weight w. But it was proven in point (b) that
in any single run, announcing the cheating action as a
class X or Y action stands a non-trivial probability to
be detected. Let ε denotes this probability. Since the
minimum distance d between codewords increases with n,
the number of runs in which both Ra and Rb applied the
class Z action while Rk needs to announce the cheating
action as a class X or Y action to make ck valid will also
grow as n increases. Thus the total probability for Rk
to pass the whole protocol without being detected will
be (1 − ε)O(n), which can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing n.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
Thus we showed that our QSS protocol is secure
against the above known cheating strategies. Moreover,
when Ra and Rb detected cheating, they know that the
cheater is located between a and b. In the case where
b = a + 2 or more participants are honest and n is suf-
ficiently large so that the values of a and b run through
many different combinations, the cheater can be more
precisely located.
On the other hand, however, there may be other at-
tacks that do not have the features we considered above,
thus may not be covered by our security analysis. For ex-
ample, in point (b) of our proof, we assumed that strate-
gies A and B are the only two cheating strategies for
inferring ϕk perfectly. Though it looks correct so far, we
have to admit that a rigorous proof is lacking. Imper-
fect cheating strategies which may only infer the value
correctly with a small probability is not considered ei-
ther. Also, Eq. (4) is calculated under the assumptions
that the codewords of the participants have no correla-
tion with each other and the randomness in the order of
announcements satisfies the distribution shown in the ap-
pendix. Is it possible that there are wiser collaboration
strategies for the cheaters to break these assumptions?
What if they agree on a course of action before the pro-
cedure starts? Or if they use quantum states other than
those specified in the original protocol? They may even
collaborate at the quantum level. That is, they store
their codewords with entangled quantum states so that
there is quantum correlation between their values and
the corresponding actions. Though there is no obvious
sign showing that these can lead to a successful cheat-
ing immediately so far, the potential possibilities are nu-
merous. It seems unpractical to expect a security proof
that is completely generally. Therefore it is worth fur-
ther studying the exact boundary of the security of our
protocol in future works.
Nevertheless, our protocol can stand more cheating
strategies than previous ones. We also wish to empha-
size that, implementation of our protocol involves merely
single qubit operations, no entanglement is needed. Thus
it can easily be realized with the technology reported in
Ref. [7]. Therefore we can enjoy the improved security
with exactly the same experimental setup.
It is also worth noting that as pointed out in Ref. [2],
the task of secret sharing can also be achieved by combin-
ing classical secret sharing with quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols [12]. More rigorously, the participant
(Alice) who holds the secret data can split the secret
classically into many shares, and transfer each share to
each of the other participants via a private channel using
QKD. But this requires a private quantum communica-
tion channel between Alice and every single one of the
other participants. That is, when N participants want
to share a secret, it should be known beforehand who
acts as Alice, then she needs to set up a private chan-
nel with each of the rest N − 1 participants, so totally
N − 1 channels are needed. If they want to make it pos-
sible that any one of them can be Alice at any time, they
will need a private channel between every pair of them,
i. e., totally (N − 1)N/2 channels are needed. On the
contrary, in our protocol the participants can set up the
secret keys ϕj first, before deciding who acts as Alice. At
a later stage, anyone of them can be Alice, and encodes
her secret with the keys ϕj . All these are achieved by the
N − 1 symmetric channels between them. Therefore our
protocol is more flexible and efficient, especially when the
number of participants is large.
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Appendix A
Here we elaborate why the probabilities mentioned in
point (c) of Sec. 6 are 1/4, 1/2, and 1/4, respectively.
That is, we evaluate the probabilities for the following
three cases in step (III) of our protocol:
(A) both Ra and Rb announced before Rk does;
(B) one and only one of Ra and Rb announced before
Rk does;
(C) none of Ra and Rb announced before Rk does.
Generally, when the sequence for each Rj (j =
2, ..., N − 1) to announce the bit cji in step (III) is per-
fectly random (i.e., any possible sequence will occur with
exactly the same probability, and the order of the oc-
currence of these sequences is completely unpredictable),
the probabilities for these three cases to occur should
all be 1/3 according to statistic theory. However, two
questions are raised: who creates these perfectly random
sequences? and how to do it?
Until today, it is still widely believed that uncondi-
tionally secure quantum coin toss and related multi-party
secure computation protocols are impossible. Therefore
in a multi-party cryptographic protocol among the dis-
trustful parties, it is hard to find a source which creates
perfectly random sequences trusty to all parties. To cir-
cumvent this problem, a practical substitution can be
done as follows. For some or all of the parties, each sug-
gests a sequence for announcing cji, then other parties
vote one-by-one either to accept or to reject this sequence
(rejection should be limited to a finite times otherwise
there may never reach any agreement). This procedure
is repeated until finally there are n sequences that are
accepted by all parties.
Now let us see what strategy each party would use on
deciding which sequences is acceptable so that the finally
sequences look secure to him. According to the security
analysis in Sec. 6, we can see that a cheater prefers to
announce later than the others do. Therefore each party
tends to accept a sequence in which his position is in the
rear. But if among the resultant sequences, the proba-
bility for a specific party to announce cji later than the
others is significantly larger than 1/2, the others may
think that this party is trying to cheat so they will reject
these sequences. As a result of the trade-off, it seems
“fair” for a party Rj1 to accept the sequences having the
following property: for any other party Rj2 , the two cases
– Rj1 announces before Rj2 does, and Rj2 announces be-
fore Rj1 does – should occur with equal probabilities in
every situation. That is, these probabilities should be
1/2 when the statistical estimation is made not only on
the entirety of all accepted sequences, but also within
any subset of the sequences where the relative positions
of other parties with respect to Rj1 are fixed (please see
the three-party example below for illustration).
When this strategy is adopted, one party can effec-
tively prevent others from taking too much advantages
from the sequences of the announcement, while without
making himself looks like a cheater. Nevertheless, the
final accepted sequences will be biased from perfect ran-
domness. Consider the order of announcement of Ra, Rb
and Rk among many parties. In 50% sequences, Ra an-
nounced before Rk does. Since in these sequences, the
probabilities for Rb to announce before or after Rk does
should both be 1/2, there will totally be 25% sequences in
which both Ra and Rb announced before Rk does. In the
other 50% sequences, Ra announces after Rk did. Since
in these sequences, the probabilities for Rb to announce
before or after Rk does should both be 1/2, there will
totally be 25% sequences in which none of Ra and Rb
announced before Rk does. This is why in point (c) of
8Sec. 6, the probabilities for cases (A) and (C) to occur
are both 1/4. Thus the probability for case (B) to occur
is 1− 1/4− 1/4 = 1/2.
As an example, let us consider the case where there are
only three parties Ra, Rb and Rk. When the sequences
is perfectly random, the following six sequences (denoted
by the indices of the parties) should occur with equal
probabilities: abk, bak, akb, bka, kab, and kba. Then
cases (A), (B) and (C) all occur with probability 1/3.
However, such a result of sequences does not satisfy
the above “fair” condition. For instance, in Ra’s point of
view, whenever Rk announces after Ra did (i.e., in abk,
bak, and akb), Rb has only probability 1/3 (i.e., when bak
occurs) to announce before Ra does, while having prob-
ability 2/3 (i.e., when abk and akb occur) to announce
after Ra did. Similarly, Ra and Rb will find the sequences
not being fair in every situation either. But if some of
the sequences, e.g. abk and kba, are rejected so that
only bak, kab, akb, and bka (note that these sequences
have the feature that both Ra and Rk are presented in
the middle twice) occur with equal probability, while the
probabilities for abk and kba to occur are neglectable,
then the result will be fair to both Ra and Rk. Mean-
while in Rb’s point of view, though this result does not
satisfy the fair condition for him, it does not have to be
rejected since it still looks random when estimated on the
entirety, because the probabilities for Rb to be presented
in the front or rear of these sequences are both 1/2. For
the same reason, if only abk, kba, akb, and bka (i.e., both
Rb and Rk are presented in the middle of the sequences
twice) occur with equal probability while the other two
sequences seldom occur, the result will be fair to both
Rb and Rk while still acceptable to Ra. Else if only bak,
kab, abk and kba occur with equal probability, the re-
sult will be fair to both Ra and Rb while still acceptable
to Rk. Therefore, as a result of the accept-reject trade-
off, the most probably accepted sequences that are fair
to majority will have the feature that the parties within
this majority will be presented mostly in the middle of
the sequences, especially when the number of parties is
large and some of them may be dishonest. Note that
even though such a result is not fair enough to few of
the parties, it is still fine to them since the sequences
still have some overall randomness, and there does not
seem to have any other better rule of accept-reject to
replace the above “fair” condition. Meanwhile, such a
result of sequences (e.g., bak, kab, akb, and bka) is not
only favored by a potential cheater (e.g. Rk), but also
favored by an honest party (e.g. Ra). Thus it cannot be
used to inferred which party is trying to cheat. Therefore
without loss of generality, we can assume that such a bi-
ased result of the sequences is finally accepted, and the
cheater is within the majority of the parties which are
benefitted. Consequently, the probabilities for cases (A),
(B) and (C) to occur are 1/4, 1/2 and 1/4 respectively,
as used in the proof in Sec. 6.
It is also worth pinpointing out that, even if a mech-
anism can be found which can avoid the sequences from
being biased by the above strategy, or can even create
perfectly random sequences for the parties, our security
analysis is still valid. This is because when the sequences
are perfectly random, the probabilities for cases (A), (B)
and (C) to occur are all 1/3 (as it can be verified by es-
timating over all the six possible sequences in the above
three-party example). Then p1 in Eq. (2) will be replaced
by
p′1 = (1− w2/n2)/3 + (1 − w/n)/3. (A1)
Since p′1 < p1, the maximum number of runs in which the
cheater Rk can announce the cheating action as a class
X or Y action will be less than the number n′ obtained
in Eq. (4). Thus the cheater is less benefitted from the
perfectly random order of announcement than the case
we studied in Sec. 6. Therefore our security analysis
already covers this case and is more general.
